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FINDING A NEW JlMEANING OF MEANING" 





In Puh1am's seminal article I'The Meaning of Meaning" (TMM)1 
several central issues to the philosophy of mind are critiqued using 
an extended thought experiment. For this paper, at least, the issues 
relevant to my ar guments will be those that deal with men tal content. 
My interest in this essay is not the validity of most of Putnam's views; 
these ideas have been widely accepted as correct. Instead, I want to 
focus on the expansion of these ideas, specifically, the ones advanced 
in the work of Tyler Burge. For Putnam, mental content is separable 
into two parts, 'wide' and 'narrow.'l Thus, while we can imagine that 
we share the identical mental states, brain constitution, etc., with our 
Twin Earth doppelganger, the external substance to which we refer 
when we say "water," is different. For me, here, now, water is H20; 
for me on Twin Earth water is XYZ. 
It is certainly the case that for Putnam my doppelganger and I 
share the same 'narrow' content, in that we are similar in all relevant 
respects internally. However, the externalities that we find ourselves 
surrounded by are different in one important enough respect, (H20 
v. XYZ), thus our 'wide' content is different. I use 'narrow' to refer 
to individual mental states that do not presuppose or depend in 
anyway on the external world, and 'wide' to designate those states 
that do. In part II of my paper I will argue that Burge's articles 
1I1ndividualism and the Mental" (1M), and "Other Bodies" (OB), 
show the impossibility of narrow mental contents. In section III I 
shall explain why Burge views Putnam as being unable to see this 
problem. On Burge's reading, Putnam's claim that natural kind 
terms are indexical obscures this error. Finally, I will address Burge's 
concerns about the inexorably referential nature of all mental con­
tents. Putnam seems to believe that not all mental contents 'fix' [refer 
to, designate, pick out, depend on] external objects. For Burge, "all 
of an agent's intentional states involving natural kinds do presup-
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pose entities other than the agent" (TMM 118). Thus, we should 
rightfully conclude that there could not be narrow mental content 
and acknowledge thatthe Twin Earth examples take us further away 
from any sort of individualism, (e.g. meanings are to be found in the 
mental contents of an isolated individual), than Putnam originally 
thought. The remainder of this essay will deal, then, with two related 
problems. The first will be how the Twin Earth examples exclude the 
possibility of narrow content. The second will be the confusion that 
occurs in Pumam's liThe Meaning of Meaning" with respect to the 
idea of narrow contents and his discussion of indexicality. I shall 
conclude with a brief Twin Earth example that is intended to show 
the impossibility of narrow content, and the necessary role of both 
the external world and the social universe. 
II. liThe Meaning ofMeaning" 
Putnam is eager to show that the traditional conception of 
meaning rests on two fundamentally false principles. These are: 
A. That knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being 
in a certain psychological state; 
B. That the meaning of a term (intension) determines its exten 
sion; E.g. sameness of intension entails sameness of extension. 
Through his Twin Earth examples, Putnam shows that it is not 
the case that being in a certain psychological state determines a 
term's meaning for an individual. I will very briefly rehash the gist 
of Putnam's arguments against principle A. We can plausibly imag­
ine a world that is qualitatively and quantitatively identical to ours, 
excepting the simple fact that on this other Earth the molecular 
structure of water is not H20, it is XYZ. We can also imagine that we 
have a duplicate on this other Earth who has the same thought 
processes, feelings, and mental contents as we do. However, it is the 
case that on Twin Earth when our duplicate talks about water, she is 
talking about XfZ, and here on Earth we are talking about H20. So, 
while this is indeed a thin sketch of Putnam's article, we can see that 
for Putnam, principle A is admittedly false. One cannot determine 
the meaning of a term by examining the psychological state of the 
individual using the term. 
For this paper, the interesting difference between Putnam and 
Burge will be shown to rest on their different revisions of principle 
B. To make this clearer, I will differentiate between the conclusions 
that Pumamreaches and those that Burge accepts. Burge is not going 
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to accept Putnam's revision of B. That is, Burge will not agree with 
Putnam that Glenn on Earth and Glenn on Twin Earth merely refer 
to whichever extended body (H20, XYZ respectively) is present 
when they talk about water. That is, while Putnam thinks intension 
can be the same and extension different, Burge argues that if exten­
sion differs intension must be different as well. Burge goes on to say 
that Glenn Earth andGlenn Twin Earth must have different mental content 
even though their respective physical constitutions are identical. It is 
not the case, for Burge, that there can be sameness of intension but a 
difference in extension. Thus, while Putnam believes he can allow 
for Glenn E and Glenn TE to have identical mental contents, but refer 
to different external objects, Burge will show this to presuppose the 
existence of narrowmental contents. The real crux issue in this paper 
will be how Burge brings Putnam's arguments to fruition. It is to this 
set of issues that I now turn. 
III. "Individualism and the Mental" 
The structures and results of "Individualism and the Mental" 
parallel closely Putnam's seminal essay. Individualism, as Burge 
construes it, is the belief that by examining an agent's mental struc­
tures, thoughts, beliefs, etc. independently of her external/ social 
enviromnentwe cancome to know the contentof the agent's thought. 
The very existence of this concept is the target of Burge's arguments, 
and after some explanatory notes we can sketch out the thought 
example and its effect on the status of mental content. 
To begin Burge makes a series of specifications to eliminate 
confusionwith regard to the sort ofmental states hewants to discuss. 
What immediately becomes crucial is the notion of obliquely occur­
ring content clauses. These are sentential expressions that contain a 
non-interchangeable referent. That is, to use the example Burge 
gives II [F]rom the facts that water is H20 and Bertrand thought that 
water is not fit to drink, it does not follow that Bertrand thought that 
H20 is not fit to drink" (1M 538). Bertrand's expression contains an 
obliquely occurring content clause because one cannot substitute the 
notion of'water' with the notion of 'H20' and preserve the meaning 
of the original sentence. Burge continues with this idea by stating 
that "Mentalistic discourse containing obliquely occurring expres­
sions has traditionally been called intentional discourse" (ibid.). Burge 
goes on to say "obliquely occurring expressions in content-clauses 
are a primary means of identifying a person's intentional mental 
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states or events" (ibid.). I will continue by explainingwhy, in talking 
about mental content this way, Burge opens the way to discrediting, 
at least, principle A from before. 
To discredit mental content in a narrow sense, Burge first makes 
a number of important distinctions. He defines a 'narrow' content 
psychological state as one in which being in said state"does not 
presuppose a proposition P if it does not logically entail P" (OB 150). 
Further, he says "being in a psychological state in the narrow sense 
is to be in a state correctly ascribable in terms of a content-clause 
which contains no expressions in a position which admits of existen­
tial generalization and which is not in any sense de reo De dicta non­
relationalpropositional attitudes would thus bepsychological states 
in the narrow sense" (ibid.). I take this to mean that, on Burge's 
reading, Putnam thinks these narrow content states do not relate in 
anyway to objects outside the agent. It is with this understanding of 
narrow content that Burge goes on to question Putnam's claim that 
these attitudes fail to 'fix' anything outside of the subject. Here again 
we need to qualify a term, and I am using 'fix' in the sense of refer to, 
or pick out. 
To see why these'narrow' contentstates cannot be narrow, as we 
have defined them above, let us return to the H20jXYZ example 
frombefore. Gle111Lrn, when he wonders if there is any water around, 
is obviously not talking about H20. The content of his mental state, 
regardless of whether he knows what the molecular structure of 
'twater' is, does not contain H20. Nor does it seem possible that it 
ever could. Both GlennE and Gle111Lrn "will have numerous proposi­
tional attitudes correctly attributable with the relevant natural kind 
terms in oblique position" (ibid.). IfGlenn on Twin Earth expresses 
the desire for a glass of 'water' [H20], as opposed to 'twater' [XYZ], 
or any other attitude containing the concept of 'water,' e.g. that this 
stream contains 'water,' he seems to have a number of false beliefs. 
Why would wewant to attribute largely false beliefs to our Twin 
Earth duplicate and largely true ones to ourselves? This appears 
immediately counterintuitive. The best response to this dilemma 
seems to be to rule out narrow content. Putnam understates the role 
that the environment and social context seem to play in determining 
the propositional attitudes of bothGlenns. If the original Twin Earth 
account is correct then it appears that we have to assume a number 
of umeasonable premises. We have to account for how Gle11l1.rn 
could ever obtain the concept of 'water', (not 'twater') without 
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having been exposed to it. We have to account for why we would 
want to violate the principle of charity2 by attributing largely false 
belief to Gle~ifwe took him to hold beliefs about 'water.' 
Hopefully, Burge~s revision of mental content and propositional 
attitudes will also lead us to a refutation, notably different from 
Putnam~s, of principle B as well. I shall go on to discuss the arthritis 
thought experiment that Burge uses, and show how this will pave the 
way for Burge's strengthening of the force of Putnam's Twin Earth 
arguments. 
Burge begins his thought experiment by talking about 
counterfactual situations. We can imagine that"A given person has 
a large number of attitudes commonly attributed with content­
clauses containing 'arthritis' in oblique occurrenceu (ibid.). This 
person would have many ideas about what arthritis was, what it 
caused, how itfelt, etc. And Burge supposes that this person, let' scalI 
him Hank, thinks he has developed arthritis in the thigh. Actually, 
Hank's physician tells him that one cannot develop arthritis in the 
thigh. Hank is sort of surprised, distraught, and"goes on to ask what 
might be wrong with his thigh" (1M 539). The counterfactual 
involves Hank2 who while being identical physically, qualitatively, 
and historically, goes to his doctor to express his concern that he has 
developedarthritis in the thigh, and is answered by the coun terfactual 
doctor in the affirmative. What does this imply? Burge thinks that 
it means that "arthritis," for Hank2's world, is used to signify not only 
the conventional cases of rheumatoid joint-inflammation, but other 
pain producing rheumatoid ills as well. 
Thus, "In the counterfactual situationl the patient lacks some-­
probably a11--of the attitudes commonly associated with content­
clauses containing 'arthritis' in oblique occurrence. He lacks the 
occurrent thoughts or beliefs that he has had arthritis in the thigh, 
that he has had arthritis for years, ... and so on" (ibid.). The difference 
in the counterfactual world is not only that the theoretical definition 
of'arthri tis' is different, but that the social praxis involving the term 
is as well. Hankzcomes to his (correct?!) conception concerning the 
usage of arthritis, not under his own steam, but rather through 
experience involving a social environment in which arthritis is used 
as a blanket term to apply to all sorts of rheumatoid ailments. Hank 
in our world learns to apply arthritis correctly not only through his 
actual encounter with joint pain, or being in the psychological state 
of having arthritis, but also through his myriad encounters with 
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others, especially those who can correctly use'arthritis,' e.g. physi­
cians. This example of Burge's should be seen to undermine indi­
vidualism [principle A from before]. Meanings are not in the hands 
of an isolated individual, or, as Putnam himself would put it "Mean­
ings just ain't in the head." 
What 1have hoped to show in the elucidation of Burge's thought 
experiment is that while being similar to Putnam's in its dismissal of 
principle A the implications go beyond natural kinds and demon­
strate the problems with the Twin Earth example. For Burge, we do 
not have to construe concepts like"arthritis" as natural kinds to get 
the medicinal effects of the thought experiment. As 1 said before, for 
GlennE and Gle11Itrn, having identical mental contents and yet refer­
ring to different external objects is not a valid option. If it is the case 
that GlennE andGle~ refer to different extended objects, then they 
cannot have identical mental contents. "Social content infects even 
the distinctively mental features of mentalistic attributions. 
[Nobody's] intentional mental phenomena are insular. Every [one] 
is a piece of the social continent, a part of the social main" (1M 545). 
IV. Another trip to Twin Earth, and those "Other Bodies" 
I said at the beginning of this paper that I would show how 
Putnam's Twin Earth examples are not compatible with the idea of 
narrow mental content. It is to this task that I now tum. I will permit 
Burge to speak for himself in explaining the main problem with 
Putnam's thought experiment. "What I reject is the view that mental 
states and processes individuated by such obliquely occurring ex­
pressions can be understood purely in terms of non-intentional 
characterizations of the individual subject's acts, skills, dispositions, 
physical states, functional states, and effects of environmental stimuli 
on him ... or the activities of his fellows" (OB 143). Further, to clarify 
how this differs from our characterization of Putnam, in changing 
tl1e external environment of the subject wemodify the contents of his 
thoughts. While Putnamhas argued that sameness in intension does 
not entail sameness in extension, d. principle B, according to Burge, 
sameness in intension is impossible if there is difference in extension. 
The confusion that Putnam's claims about the indexicality of natural 
kind terms creates will dissipate once we see that Burge denies that 
there is indexicality in terms like 'water.' 
We all know about the TwinEarth example. GlennE and Gle11l.'1.rn 
are identical in all respects. Their respective worlds are as welt 
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exceptthat'waterl onEarth is H2O and I twater/ as Burge refers to the 
water on Twin Earth is XYZ. However, to paraphrase Burge, when 
Glenna thinks or says 'There is some water within twenty miles, I 
hope,' Glenn", must reciprocally think the same sentence. YetI for 
Putnam this entails that Glenna is thinking about Iwater' [H20] and 
Glenn", is thinking about ItwaterI [XYZ]. IIAnd, as Putnam does not 
notel the differences [in the actual physical constitutions of 'water' 
and 'twater/] affect oblique occurrences in that-clauses that provide 
the contents of their mental states and eventslf (OB 145). What Burge 
is getting at is that on Earth, Glenn is hoping that he can discover 
some H20 ['water']. Counterfactually, on Twin Earth, Glenn is 
hoping he can discover some XYZ etwaterT IIThat is, even as we 
suppose thaewater' and ' twater' are notlogically exchangeable with 
coextensive expressions salva veritate, we have a difference between 
their thought (contentsY' (OB 145). So while Putnam thinks that the 
different extensions of'water' on Earth and Twin Earth donot impI y 
the existence of different intensions, Burge has shown this supposi­
tion to be mistaken. liThe difference in their mental states and events 
seems to be a product primarily of differences in their physical 
envirorunents - in the mental states of their fellows and conventional 
meanings of words they and their fellows emplot' (OB 146). 
Now we can directly address the problem of indexicality, and 
why Burge thinks that this is a major reason for Putnam to leave the 
force of his own arguments out to dry. While Puhlam thinks that 
natural kind terms like Iwater' have an indexical component, Burge 
does not want to allow this conclusion. In fact, Burge states, 11 that 
'waterl interpreted as it is in English, or as we English speakers 
standardly interpret it, does not shift extension from context to 
context ... The extension of Iwater' as interpreted in English in all 
non-oblique contexts, is (roughly) the set of all aggregates of H20 
molecules. There is nothing at all indexical about 'water' in the 
customary sense oeindexicallll (OB 146). Burge continues by criticiz­
ing some of the grounds that Putnam uses to claim that'water' is 
indexical. One of these is: 
1. 'Water' is stuff that bears a certain similarity relation to the 
water aroundhere. Water at another time or in another place 
or even in another possible world has to bear the relation 
[same-liquid] to our 'water' in order to be water. (T.Mlv119) 
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The main criticism that Burge has with this conception of the 
indexicality of 'water' is a simple one. If GlennE was to visit Twin 
Earth and ostensively indicate the XYZ in the stream, that is, call 'that 
stuff there 'water,' for Putnam this would be a true declaration. 
However, by Putnam's previous account of Twin Earth, there is no 
'water' [H2O] there. II And there is no reason why anEnglish speaker 
should not be held to this account when he visits Twin Earth. The 
problem is that although 'here' shifts its extension with context, 
'water' does not. Water lacks the indexicality of 'here'lf (OB 147). 
I continually have been referring to the confusion that results 
when we allow Putnam to claim that natural kind terms have an 
indexical component. For Burge, allowing this claim to stand "has 
large implications for ourunderstanding of mentalistic notions" (0B 
149). It is the case, for Burge, that /I the identity of one's mental 
contents, states, and events is not independent of the nature of one's 
physical and social environment" (ibid.). It seems hard to accept that 
'water' is indexical. Suppose you or I were to be instantaneously 
switched with our Twin Earth doppelganger. When we, on Twin 
Earth, asked for a glass of 'water,' we would not be making any 
reference to 'twater.' The two are different substances, and our 
unwitting indication of 'twater' whenwe mean 'water,' evenifitgoes 
unnoticed, points out the non~indexicality of natural ki~d terms. 
V. Conclusions 
The last relevant section of the Burge piece, "Other Bodies," can 
beviewed as showinghow propositional attitudes do indeed I fix' the 
extensions of the relevant terms. To radically oversimplify this point 
before I end, I shall quote Burge once more, "[Glenn's] attitude 
contents involving relevant natural kind notions~- and thus, all his 
relevant attitudes--are individuated by reference to other entities. 
His having these attitudes in the relevant circumstances entails the 
existence of other entities" (OB 155). This quotation makes more 
sense once I tell you that Burge previously noted that even in 
presupposing counterfactual situations we must make use of the 
actual existence of things. This seems to me somewhat like a rigid 
designator conception. We can imagine, at least momentarily, a 
world where Monica Lewinsky did not exist, or had blond hair, or a 
small nose, etc. However, for us to be able to do so hinges on our 
knowledge thatMonica Lewinsky did in fact exist here and now. To 
return to section II, Burge does not find Putnam's notion of narrow 
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content states acceptable. It is umealistic to suppose that one can 
hold a belief P, where P is a belief about x and x has no existent 
counterpart in the world that we are part of. That is, there could be 
no x that the holder of belief P has heard spoken of in the world, 
experienced, etc. 
The twofold thesis of this paper is that Putnam was incorrect to 
accept the existence of narrow content mental states and that Burge, 
in exposing this error, can explain why mental content is not in the 
hands of the individuaL For Burge, there cannot be a difference in 
extension without a correspondent difference in propositional con­
tent-clause beliefs. Burge is correct to see that Putnam's false beliefs, 
that there can be narrow content states and that natural kind terms 
have an indexical component, obscure the true force of the Twin 
Earth thought experiment. Putnam radically underestimates the 
importance of having the sort of social environment like Hank, in our 
arthritis example does, to obtain correct knowledge of the meaning 
of a term and the correspondent mental content. The conceivability 
ofHank2 to refer to "arthritis" as Hank does in our world, or to have 
the sort of mental content that we do regarding arthritis is niL For 
Burge, the intricate social interplay between speakers helps account 
for mental content. It is because Burge wants to prove this that he 
discounts the possibility of narrow mental content. All mental 
content for Burge is broad, in the sense that it is inextricably related 
to both the physical and social environments. To end, I hope that this 
paperhas explicated the differences to be found inPutnam's revision 
of the traditional principles of meaning [A and B] that comes out of 
the Twin Earth examples, and Burge's reinterpreta tion of these. For 
Burget mental contentjustain't determined by the things inourhead. 
It is also determined, to a larger degree than Putnam admits, by the 
actual things in the external world and our sodal networks. 
NOTES 
1.This view is not really held by Putnam anymoret but for the sake of the 
arguments in my paper I needed these arguments as foils for Burge. 
2. The 'principle of charity' was the label used by Daniel Dennett in his article 
IITrue Believers as Intentional Systemsll in The Nature of Mind (New York: 
Oxford University Presst 1991). D. Rosenthat ed., to explain why we must 
attribute largely true beliefs to other persons in order to make rational sense of 
their actions. 
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